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Changes in War’s Character

The Individualization of American Warfare
Glenn J. Voelz

Abstract: Since 9-11, the United States has embarked on a decade
of doctrinal and technical innovations focused on defeating networks and individual combatants rather than formations. This article examines this evolving model of individualized warfare within
the context of current debates over the appropriate role of military
landpower in an age dominated by persistent threats from non-state
actors and unconventional adversaries.

I

n late 2014, the United States reached a milestone of the 500th
non-battlefield targeted strike.1 Beyond the numbers, this event
is notable as one example of a new mode of state warfare based
on military power being applied directly against individual combatants
rather than formations. These so-called “targeted killings” are perhaps
the most vivid example of the individualization of American warfare,
particularly the Commander-in-Chief routinely reviewing and approving
strikes against named combatants, a phenomenon “without precedent
in presidential history.”2 However, this operational trend is by no means
limited to high-level counterterrorism efforts. It represents a more systematic disaggregation of national security threats and the adoption of
an individualized approach to military targeting that has dramatically
transformed the American way of war. Within this paradigm, the targeting of “high value individuals” and networks has replaced conventional
force engagement as the driving force of recent doctrinal change and
technical innovation.”
As the defining operational experience for a generation of junior
leaders, this new mode of warfare reflects the culmination of a decade of
tactical lessons, doctrinal adaptations, technical advances, and changes
to the institutional cultures of the US military. Indeed, since 9-11 the US
armed forces have “developed the fusion of operations and intelligence
for the purpose of hunting high-value targets into a high art.”3 Yet even
as these methods have been widely applied, there remains insufficient
analysis as to their effectiveness and utility as an element of US military
1      Micah Zenko, “The US Just Launched Its 500th Drone Strike,” Defense One, November 21,
2014, The New American Foundation, Long War Journal, and Bureau of Investigative Journalism all monitor
US drone strikes taking place outside the “active combat zones” of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya.
The sum of 500 total strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia represent an average among the range
of estimates as of November 2014.
2      Jo Becker and Scott Shane, “Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will,”
New York Times, May 29, 2012.
3      Linda Robinson, Paul D. Miller, John Gordon IV, Jeffrey Decker, Michael Schwille, Raphael S.
Cohen, Improving Strategic Competence: Lessons from 13 Years of War (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014) 26
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power.4 This article describes the catalysts driving the individualization
of American warfare and considers the implications for future national
security strategy and the Army.

A Post-Westphalian Logic of Warfare

The rise of individualized warfare stands in stark contrast to the preceding Cold War era where focus of operational planning, intelligence
analysis, and doctrine centered primarily on the conduct of large-scale
conventional warfare against nation-state adversaries. The transition is
even more profound as a departure from the foundational presumptions of the “Westphalian” system that defined the context of state
warfare for over three hundred years. The end of the Thirty Years War
was notable as the transition point from the age of private mercenary
conflicts towards a modern construct of warfare in which combatants
became instruments of the state, acting on behalf of political sovereigns
rather than fighting for individual gain.5 This period also marked the
“depersonalization” of conflict as soldiers assumed collective identities
as members of professional armies. Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s seminal
treatise on political power articulated the significance of this transition,
noting modern warfare was no longer a “relationship between one man
and another, but a relationship between one state and another, in which
individuals are enemies only by accident, not as men, nor even as citizens, but as soldiers.”6 This shift provided the intellectual foundation
for legal categorizations supporting the concept of lawful combatancy
and the treatment of prisoners, wounded soldiers, and civilians on the
battlefield.
As the Westphalian system depersonalized warfare, soldiers became
“generic” members of their national armies in terms of legal status and
appearance. Geo-political boundaries and national affiliations determined the application and scope of wartime protections, while uniforms
emerged to distinguish soldiers from civilians and to provide the operational context for lawful targeting.7 Within this mode of warfare, the
treatment of soldiers became status-based, meaning that privileges,
obligations and rules of engagement were no longer linked to individual
identity but rather to the soldiers’ generic status as part of a state formation.8 This convention has come under challenge as a result of recent
conflicts waged by “unprivileged enemy belligerents,” disqualified from
the privileges of combatant status as a result of joining or substantially
supporting non-state armed groups in the conduct of hostilities. The
ambiguous status of these combatants has led to a revolution in the logic
4      A recent paper by Austin Long, “Whack-a-Mole or Coup de Grace? Institutionalization and
Leadership Targeting in Iraq and Afghanistan,” Security Studies 23, no. 3 (July 2014) offers a useful
overview of recent scholarship on the topic and thoughtful examination of leadership targeting in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Separately, there is a significant body of literature on Israeli use of targeted
killings and methods of precision targeting, particularly in relation to operations in Gaza. While
potentially useful as a comparative case study, that discussion is beyond the scope of this article.
5      Martin van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1999), 162-163.
6      Jean Jacques Rousseau, “The Social Contract,” in The Social Contract and Other Writings, ed.
Victor Gourevitch (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 51.
7      Gabriella Blum, “The Individualization of War: From War to Policing in the Regulation of
Armed Conflicts,” in Law and War: An Introduction, eds. Austin Sarat, Lawrence Douglas, and Martha
Merrill Umphrey (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014), 52.
8      For elaboration on this concept see Gabriella Blum, “The Dispensable Lives of Soldiers,”
Journal of Legal Analysis 2, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 115-147.
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of military targeting and a shift towards highly individualized assessment of threats. This new operational paradigm reflects a personalized
form of warfare where the legitimate use of military force has become
“tied to quasi-adjudicative judgments about the individual acts and roles
of specific enemy figures.”9

Doctrine and Individualized Warfare

The individualization of American warfare is readily apparent in
contemporary doctrine and operational practices, specifically in applications of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies. Debates
over these war-fighting theories have led to doctrinal incoherence with
regard to specific methods; however, on a conceptual and operational
level they share the important commonality of systematically individualizing the adversary. One of the early lessons of campaigns in Iraq and
Afghanistan was “conventional warfare approaches often were ineffective when applied to operations other than major combat, forcing
leaders to realign the ways and means of achieving effects.”10 The central
challenge, as the Army’s targeting manual notes, was in “contrast to
major theater operations where the purpose is to find and destroy ships,
tank formations, or infrastructure, the most difficult task in insurgencies
is finding the enemy.”11 Over the last decade the US military has demonstrated remarkable adaptability towards this end, marked by a major
evolution in doctrinal methods and war-fighting approaches focused on
the problem of identifying and targeting individual combatants. While
counterinsurgency doctrine pointedly emphasizes a broad range of
governance and stability measures, much of the tactical focus in recent
campaigns gravitated towards highly refined kinetic and non-kinetic targeting efforts designed to “identify and separate the reconcilables from
the irreconcilables.”12 This effort included aggressive efforts to identify
key actors within insurgent networks and conduct kill/capture operations against top-tier targets.13 Over the last decade, doctrinal methods
evolved in direct response to these operational priorities and strategic
approaches.
The “find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate” targeting
approach evolved specifically as the preferred methodology for identifying and engaging high-value individuals.14 US forces in both Iraq
and Afghanistan applied this find-and-fix approach with great success
against insurgent networks and terrorist cells. In Iraq, these networkbased targeting approaches were used to develop “all-source intelligence
to provide situational awareness of the local environment, its social
9      Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes, “Targeted Warfare: Individuating Enemy
Responsibility,” New York University Law Review 88, no. 5 (November 2013): 1521.
10      US Joint Chief of Staff, Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis Division (J7), Decade of
War Volume 1: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations (Washington, DC: US Joint Chiefs
of Staff, June 15, 2012), 2.
11      US Department of the Army, The Targeting Process, Field Manual 3-60 (Washington, DC: US
Department of the Army, November 26, 2010), Appendix B-1.
12      General David Petraeus, Commander, US Central Command, Multi-National Force-Iraq,
“Counterinsurgency Guidance,” June 21, 2008.
13      One may arguably identify precursor models of individualized targeting in the Phoenix
Program from Vietnam or from other counterinsurgency examples. However, these cases are significantly different from recent US experience in terms of the scope of application, as well as the
broader intellectual, technical and doctrinal impact on war-fighting strategy.
14      Also sometimes referred to as F3EAD.
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networks, key decision-makers, and their motivations,” most famously
applied during the successful effort to track, target, and kill terrorist
leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.15 In Afghanistan, such individualized
approaches were used extensively in targeting insurgent networks, resulting in a five-fold increase in raids between 2009 and 2011 designed to
capture or kill high-level insurgents.16 Beyond targeting active combatants, similar methods were applied against drug producers and criminal
networks as a means to undermine financial support to insurgencies.
Over the last decade, this find-and-fix approach has migrated into
conventional targeting doctrine and the Army’s institutional training
programs.17 Attack-the-Network theory (AtN) offers another example of
the doctrinal trend towards individualized warfare. This theory emerged
specifically for defeating improvised-explosive-device networks in Iraq
and Afghanistan, and over time has been applied to a broad range of
missions such as tracking Joseph Koni and Lord’s Resistance Army in
Uganda, analyzing the spread of Boko Haram influence in Nigeria, and
understanding threat finance patterns of narcotics networks in Latin
America.
Both find-and-fix and Attack-the-Network methodologies reflect
an evolution in analytical approaches related to the adoption of Social
Network Analysis for military targeting. Application of Social Network
Analysis to complex networks predates recent campaigns with significant
scholarly research dating back to the 1960s, notably Stanley Milgram’s
early work on network theory and structural disintermediation.18 Admiral
Arthur Cebrowski’s influential “network-centric warfare” expanded the
notion to distributed sensor systems and precision targeting; however,
he did not conceive of such methods being used specifically against
individual combatants. These concepts were more directly articulated
in John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt’s, Networks and Netwars, where they
described the rise of non-state actors organized as decentralized networks.19 Under the guise of “fourth generation warfare,” William Lind,
T.X. Hammes and others, foresaw such networks and individual actors
supplanting the state as primary drivers of a new security environment,
an idea later sensationalized by Thomas Friedman’s thesis on “super
empowered individuals.”20
Operational Social Network Analysis techniques were introduced
directly in the influential 2006 publication of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency,
and have since matured into a foundational component of doctrinal

15      Christopher J. Lamb and Evan Munsing, Secret Weapon: High-Value Target Teams as an
Organizational Innovation (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, March 2011), 33.
16      Carlotta Gall, “Night Raids Curbing Taliban, but Afghans Cite Civilian Toll,” New York Times,
July 8, 2011; and Tom Peter, “Afghanistan: NATO’s Night Raids Cause More Harm Than Good,
Report Says,” Christian Science Monitor, September 19, 2011.
17      Charles Faint and Michael Harris, “F3EAD: Ops/Intel Fusion Feeds The SOF Targeting
Process,” Small Wars Journal, January 31, 2012.
18      Steve Ressler, “Social Network Analysis as an Approach to Combat Terrorism: Past, Present
and Future Research,” Homeland Security Affairs 2, no. 2 (July 2006).
19      John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and
Militancy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001).
20      Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Anchor Books, 2000).
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thinking.21 These techniques provided the framework for identifying
individual roles, organizational positions, and influential actors within
given networks. At the tactical level, Social Network Analysis supported
the practical need for conducting “pattern of life” analysis, identifying
associations, habits, locations, movement routes, financial transactions, and overall visualization of network dynamics down to the level
of individual actors. Information obtained from this network analysis
often focused on personalized details such as physical descriptions of
suspects, their biographic histories, familial relations, biometric data,
and forensic evidence in support of operational targeting.22
The recent emergence of Identity Intelligence (I2) and methods
for personality-based targeting offers another example of the doctrinal
evolution towards individualized warfare.23 Identity Intelligence is not
an intelligence process, per se, but rather tailored products derived from
the fusion of identity attributes (biologic, biographic, behavioral, and
reputational information) into operational planning processes. Identity
Intelligence integrates the technical disciplines of biometrics, forensics,
document and media exploitation, with other all-source data for the
purpose of “connecting individuals to other persons, places, events, or
materials” and analyzing patterns of life.24 Only in the last few years has
Identity Intelligence matured as part of recognized doctrine; however,
its use in support of military operations evolved rapidly due to the
challenges of identifying and targeting individuals in environments
where positive identification has been problematic due to unverifiable
documentation or intentional evasion. Recognizing these challenges,
the DoD formally established biometrics as a core function in 2012
and directed combatant commands to integrate biometrics into mission
planning.25
What is remarkable about the evolution of counterinsurgency and
counterterrorism practices is the degree to which operational targeting has not only become individualized, but also personalized through
the integration of identity functions. The greatest weapon of insurgent
networks in Iraq and Afghanistan was anonymity, specifically the
ability of fighters to blend in with, and disappear into, local populations. Population-centric approaches of counterinsurgency, therefore,
placed Identity Intelligence activities at the center of efforts “to positively identify, track, characterize, and disrupt threat actors.”26 In Iraq
the targeting of high-value individuals became closely integrated with
21      For example, Social Network Analysis techniques feature prominently in the most recent
version of US Department of the Army, Intelligence Analysis, Army Techniques Publication 2-33.4
(Washington, DC: US Department of the Army, August 2014), as a methodology in US Joint Chiefs
of Staff, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, Joint Publication 2.01-3 (Washington,
DC: US Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 2009), and in US Department of the Army, The Targeting Process,
Field Manual 3-60 (Washington, DC: US Department of the Army, November 2010).
22      US Department of the Army, The Targeting Process, Appendix B-1.
23      Identity intelligence (I2) appeared for the first time as part of US doctrine in October 2013
as part of the updated version of US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Intelligence, Joint Publication 2.0
(Washington, DC: US Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 2013).
24      US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Counterterrorism, Joint Publication 3-26 (Washington, DC: US Joint
Chiefs of Staff, October 24, 2014), V-5
25      Deputy Secretary of Defense, Authority to Collect, Store, and Share Biometric Information of NonUS Persons with US Government (USG) Entities and Partner Nations, Memorandum, Washington, DC,
January 13, 2012.
26      US Joint Chief of Staff, Counterinsurgency, Joint Publication 3-24 (Washington, DC: US Joint
Chiefs of Staff, November 2013), XVI.
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efforts against broader facilitation networks (finance, recruitment, training, logistics, media, command and control). This integration included
non-kinetic targeting against specific individuals using such methods as
leaflets, “most wanted” posters, text messaging, and hotline tip numbers
to create a “spotlight effect” for denying insurgents access to particular operational areas.27 Identity Intelligence tools and techniques were
also integrated into a wide range of missions dependent on the ability
to identify and distinguish specific actors on the battlefield such as
focused raids, checkpoint and area security, border control operations,
and detailed mapping of “human terrain.” In sum, the commonalities
among these diverse missions are doctrinal approaches and war-fighting
techniques focused on the lowest common battlefield denominators of
identifying and targeting individual combatants.

Technology and Individualized Warfare

The individualization of warfare has been fueled by several key
technical innovations over the last decade, including advances in persistent surveillance, standoff precision strike, data analytics, biometrics,
and forensics capabilities. These tools directly enabled what has been
described as a “patient and relentless man-hunting campaign” waged
by the US military against non-state actors.28 Certainly, the most visible
technology of this new mode of warfare has been the use of unmanned
aerial vehicles, or drones. Prior to 9-11, their operational use was limited
primarily to reconnaissance missions in the Balkans and Afghanistan;
they were not tested as a weapons platforms until early 2001, and then
were rapidly adapted for kinetic targeting in Afghanistan. Early in the
campaign, General Tommy Franks called the Predator “my most capable
sensor in hunting down and killing al Qaeda and Taliban leadership.”29
These platforms soon emerged as a central component in the military’s high-value targeting programs, and their number increased more
than 40-fold between 2002 and 2010.30 In Afghanistan there were a
total of 74 military drone strikes during all of 2007; yet by 2012, that
number averaged 33 strikes per month.31 Over time, improved sensors
and software packages enabled analysts to “recognize and categorize
humans and human-made objects,” providing unprecedented real-time
surveillance and detailed granularity for targeting individual combatants.32 Perhaps more significant has been the degree to which such drone
strikes “have gone from a relative rarity to a relatively common practice”
as a tool of US counterterrorism.33 Indeed, unclassified estimates suggest
27      Joint Center for Operational Analysis, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, January 2007 to December
2008 The Comprehensive Approach: An Iraq Case Study (Norfolk, Virginia: US Joint Forces Command,
February 2010), 14.
28      Robert O. Work and Shawn Brimley, 20YY Preparing for War in the Robotic Age (Washington,
DC: Center for a New American Security, 2014), 17.
29      Mark Mazzetti, The Way of the Knife (New York: Penguin Books, 2014), 94-101; also, Andrew
Callam, “Drone Wars: Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” International Affairs Review 18, no. 3
(Winter 2010).
30      Jeremiah Gertler, US Unmanned Aerial Systems (Washington DC: Congressional Research
Service, January 3, 2012).
31      Amitai Etzioni, “The Great Drone Debate,” Military Review 93, no. 2 (March-April 2013): 2.
32      Andrew Callam, “Drone Wars: Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” International Affairs Review
18, no. 3 (Winter 2010).
33      Stimson Center, Recommendations and Report of the Task Force on US Drone Policy (Washington,
DC: Stimson Center, 2014), 11.
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over 98 percent of non-battlefield targeted killings over the last decade
have been conducted by these platforms.34
However, the expanded use of persistent surveillance introduced
new challenges for analysts with a deluge of sensor data making it “nearly
impossible to track and identify suspicious activities and potential security threats solely through human analytical processes.”35 A separate
analytical challenge has evolved from the need to collect and interpret
different signatures from those of the doctrinally coherent, state-based
adversaries of the Cold War era. Analysts must now process and correlate multiple streams of disparate, unstructured data such as cell phone
numbers, biographic data, digital communications, biometric signatures,
and forensic evidence in support of lethal and non-lethal targeting. This
requirement has produced new data processing techniques specifically
designed to leverage Social Network Analysis methods, including tools
such as Analyst Notebook and the Distributed Common Ground System
(DCGS), enabling data integration and advanced network analysis.
Other database systems employed in Iraq and Afghanistan, such as the
Combined Information Data Network Exchange, a massive repository
of tactical reporting, evolved in response to the immense data processing challenge of analyzing insurgent activities, individual identities, and
operational patterns.
Of all the technical advances emerging in recent years, biometrics
and forensics are perhaps the most vivid examples of the central role
of technology in waging individualized warfare. The need to verify
identity and distinguish adversaries from the larger population led to
the expansion in the use of biometric systems on the battlefield.36 As
with drone technology, there had been no significant operational use
of biometrics by the US military prior to Iraq and Afghanistan. In early
2001, the Army began developing the Biometric Automated Toolset
(BAT), offering an initial capability to collect, match and store biometric
and personal identifying information. The first major combat employment of biometrics occurred in 2004 by Marine Corps units in Iraq
where the technology was used to quarantine an insurgent safe haven in
Fallujah through biometric screening.37 Use of this technology grew as
part of the 2007 “surge” as the primary means of identity verification
and separating insurgents from the larger population. Biometrics, linked
with operational forensics, was also used extensively for analyzing and
penetrating cells employing improvised explosive devices, and by the
end of operations in Iraq the US had complied a biometric database of
some 3 million files on Iraqi citizens.38
Similarly, in Afghanistan, over 7,000 biometric collection devices
have been employed in support of detention operations, execution of
34      Micah Zenko, Reforming US Drone Strike Policies (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign
Relations, January 2013), 8.
35      Sandra I. Erwin, “As Defense, Intelligence Agencies Drown in Data, Technology Comes to
the Rescue,” Nation Defense Magazine, November 2014.
36      US Department of Defense, Defense Science Board Task Force on COIN and ISR Operations
(Washington, DC: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics, February 2011), 65.
37      Thom Shanker, “To Track Militants, US Has System that Never Forgets a Face,” New York
Times, July 13, 2011.
38      Spencer Ackerman, “US Holds on to Biometric Database of 3 Million Iraqis,” Wired Magazine,
Danger Room Blog, December 21, 2011, http://www.wired.com/2011/12/iraq-biometrics-database/.
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high-risk warrants, and targeted raids against identified insurgents.39
Between 2004 and 2011, US forces collected biometric data on more
than 1.1 million individuals - equivalent to roughly one of every six
fighting age males - and used this data to identify thousands of known
enemy combatants.40 This measure was of particular importance in
Afghanistan, a country with limited institutional capacity for identity
verification, few birth certificates, drivers’ licenses and citizenship
documents, exacerbated by an active black market in forged identity
papers. For similar reasons, biometric technologies have spread to other
theaters where identity cannot be reliably verified by available documentation, such as counter-piracy operations in East Africa.41 As an Identity
Intelligence specialist at the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command
explained, “biometrics puts a uniform on the enemy” and enables the
categorization of actors even in the absence of traditional status-based
signatures.42
Expeditionary forensics is another technical area that evolved
rapidly in direct response to the shift towards individualized warfare.
Forensic tools and analysis supported evidenced-based targeting
methods used to individualize, identify, associate, and scientifically link
people, places, things, intentions, activities, organizations, and events.
In late 2004, US forces in Iraq began collecting battlefield forensic
materials to identify suspected insurgents by cross-referencing evidence with detainee biometrics in support of follow-on targeting and
prosecution. By 2006, this capability expanded to include numerous
expeditionary forensic facilities analyzing ammunition, clothing, latent
fingerprints, and DNA, among other materials. By 2010, the United
States had deployed a total of seven forensic laboratories to Iraq and
eight to Afghanistan.43 During that year alone, expeditionary forensics
enabled the capture of over 700 high-value individuals associated with
improvised explosive devices, or suspected terrorist and criminal activities.44 According to one report, this fusion of forensic and biometric
information into actionable intelligence directly enabled “precise fires
to shape the operational environment, including supply chain interdiction, counter-threat finance operations, information operations, cache
destruction, and the capture of high-value individuals.”45 The task force
responsible for detainee operations in Afghanistan estimated that some
70 percent of key individual targets captured on the battlefield had been

39      David Pendall and Cal Sieg, “Biometric-Enabled Intelligence in Regional Command–East,”
Joint Forces Quarterly 72, no. 1 (January 2014): 70
40      US Government Accountability Office, Additional Training for Leaders and More Timely
Transmission of Data Could Enhance the Use of Biometrics in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: US
Government Accountability Office, April 2012), 1.
41      David Axe, “CSI Somalia: Interpol Targets Pirates,” Wired Magazine, Danger Room Blog, June
18, 2009, http://www.wired.com/2009/06/csi-somalia-interpol-targets-pirates/.
42      Antonia Greene, “Including Biometrics in Deployment Training Helps Soldiers Identify the
Enemy,” Army, April 30, 2012.
43      US Government Accountability Office, Additional Planning and Oversight Needed to Establish an
Enduring Expeditionary Forensic Capability (Washington, DC: US Government Accountability Office,
June 2013), 4.
44      Oliver Herion, “Expeditionary Forensic Support to Joint Force Commanders: What Changes
or Considerations are Warranted?” (Quantico, VA: US Marine Corps Command and Staff College,
April 2012), v.
45      Thomas B. Smith and Marc Tranchemontagne, “Understanding the Enemy: The Enduring
Value of Technical and Forensic Exploitation,” Joint Forces Quarterly 75, no. 4 (October 2014): 124.
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identified with the help of biometrics and forensics technologies.46 A
study by the Army Audit Agency similarly concluded the conflicts in
Iraq and Afghanistan had revolutionized expeditionary forensics and
operational use of latent fingerprints and DNA, in particular.47 In sum,
the introduction of these technologies enabled a fundamental paradigm
shift in targeting whereby combatants were no longer “generic” soldiers
on the battlefield, but rather targeted as individuals based on identity
attributes and evidentiary analyses (see table below).
Key Characteristics of Industrial & Individualized Warfare
Industrial Warfare
Political Context

Westphalian; professional armies
fighting as political proxies with
defined geo-political objectives;
recognizes Jus in Bello constructs
Adversary
State armies comprised of
Characteristics
“generic” professional soldiers
applying doctrinal methods and a
depersonalized, bureaucratic logic
Operational
Contested primarily in the physiEnvironment
cal domain (land, sea, air, space);
engagements within a contiguous,
linear battle-space with explicit
operational boundaries
Theories of
Influenced by traditional tenets
War-fighting
of maneuver warfare, mass,
firepower, destruction of enemy
forces and seizure of key terrain
Analytical
Order of Battle analysis, doctrinal
Approach & Tools templating, traditional Indications
and Warning, conventional ISR
and technical signatures
Targeting Paradigm Status-based targeting against
units, formations and equipment
Objectives &
Physical attrition/destruction
Measures of
of the adversary war-fighting
Effectiveness
capability; predominantly
quantitative assessment - units
destroyed, terrain seized, kinetic
effects and technical BDA
Success Criteria & Defeat of adversary military force
End State
compels political capitulation,
orderly demobilization and
repatriation of combatants

Individualized War
Post-Westphalian; individual
combatants fighting for ideological
causes and ambiguous objectives;
challenges Jus in Bello constructs
Non-state entities; “unprivileged”
combatants using anonymity for
operational advantage; idiosyncratic,
highly personalized networks
Contested primarily in the
informational domain (influence and
identity); spatially and temporally
unbounded; fusion of military and
domestic security spheres
Influenced by counterinsurgency
and counterterrorism doctrines;
stability concerns, governance, and
population-centric approaches
Social Network Analysis, Attack
the Network, Identity Intelligence,
biometrics and forensic signatures,
document and media exploitation
Identity-based targeting against
individuals, cells and networks
Slowing the regeneration of key
leadership and operators; predominantly qualitative assessment - kill/
capture high value individuals,
measures of network centrality,
influence and cohesion
Risk mitigation rather than military
victory; legal limbo for detained
combatants and fighter recidivism
presents enduring challenge

46      Anthony Iasso, “A Critical Time for Biometrics and Identity Intelligence,” Military Intelligence
Professional Bulletin (July-September 2013): 39-40.
47      US Army Audit Agency, Workforce Requirements for Expeditionary Forensics, Audit Report No.
A-2012-0031-FFD (Alexandria, VA: December 27, 2011)
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Policy Imperatives and Strategic Choices

While new doctrine and supporting technologies have provided the
methods and tools of individualized warfare, ultimately this paradigm
shift resulted from specific policy preferences and strategic choices in
response to the threats posed by non-state actors. The 2001 Authorization
for Use of Military Force (AUMF) established the initial legal context
for waging war against individuals and geographically dispersed networks with broad language authorizing the use of force against “nations,
organizations, or persons.”48 CIA Director John Brennan articulated what
might be considered the “trickle-down” logic of this approach, describing how these methods have gradually expanded to wider networks
of individual actors, noting that “in this armed conflict, individuals
who are part of al-Qaida or its associated forces are legitimate military
targets.”49 Yet this strategic approach has expanded far beyond “leadership strikes,” and now reflects a new paradigm of war waged by “precise
attacks against individuals” as the centerpiece of US counterterrorism
approaches in Pakistan, Yemen and elsewhere.50
The trend towards such individualized approaches seems a logical
path for a liberal democracy dealing with the threat of terrorism while
balancing the rights of citizens. Public discomfort with profiling
techniques in the aftermath of 9-11 created political pressure to focus
targeting against individuals with legitimate connections to terrorism
rather than applying categorical measures against entire suspect groups
(racial, ethnic, religious, or otherwise). More recently, public outcry
over broad application of domestic intelligence gathering by the NSA
suggests similar disapproval of dragnet-like approaches to counterterrorism. However, Americans have expressed few reservations with
focused intelligence collection and lethal targeting based on evidentiary
approaches and presumptions of culpability, thus presenting few political liabilities.51
Beyond the domestic audience, international opinion has also
pushed the US toward an individualized, and increasingly personalized
approach to warfare. Perhaps the best example has been the broad condemnation of US “signature strikes” directed against detected patterns
of adversary behavior, or signatures, rather than specific individuals.52
This approach closely resembles conventional targeting methods applied
against formations, equipment and facilities where technical signatures
generally offer reliable categorization of intended targets. However, this
technique has produced numerous incidents of misidentification and
unintended civilian casualties with significant political repercussions,
notably in Pakistan and Yemen, but also during military operations in
48      Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), Joint Resolution 23, 107th Cong., 1st sess.
(September 14, 2001). Also, Public Law § 2(a), 115 Stat at 224.
49      John O. Brennan, “The Efficacy and Ethics of US Counterterrorism Strategy,” Transcript of
Remarks at the Wilson Center, April 30, 2012.
50      John Yoo, “Assassinations or Targeted Killings Since 9/11,” New York Law School Review 57
(2011): 63.
51      Sarah Kreps, “Do Americans Really Love Drone Strikes?” Washington Post, June 6, 2014, and
Pew Research, Global Attitudes Project Survey, “Global Opinions of US Surveillance,” (Spring
2014), http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/14/nsa-opinion/.
52      Steve Coll, “The Unblinking Stare: The Drone War in Pakistan,” The New Yorker, November
24, 2014.
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Iraq and Afghanistan.53 In response, the Obama administration has
reportedly moved towards increased use of “personality” strikes only
against confirmed individuals in order to avoid diplomatic fallout from
unintended causalities. This process has been formalized by the creation
of a “disposition matrix,” a dynamic, individualized targeting database
consisting of biographies, locations, associations and operational profiles of high-value targets.54 The administration has also suggested a
policy preference for capture and prosecution of individual suspects,
when feasible.55
In terms of military strategy, the individualization of warfare has
also exposed an inherent tension between traditional military activities
and law enforcement functions when today’s targeting packages have
more similarities with police arrest warrants than with conventional
targeting folders of the Cold War-era. During the later phases of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, high-value targeting increasingly involved
such “evidence-based” methodologies, relying on identity verification
and forensic science to produce probable-cause-like adjudications as the
basis of actionable intelligence. One observer noted, the find-and-fix
paradigm evolved into a “police-like investigate, arrest, convict” model
of non-lethal targeting.56 Indeed, the current preference for such individualized approaches will continue to obfuscate traditional concepts
of state warfare and raise difficult procedural questions as technology
enables ever-greater disaggregation of the battlefield—and increasingly
personalized targeting methods.

Challenges for the Future

The US response to threats from non-state actors has evolved into
a new mode of warfare placing the individual combatant at the center
of the analytical and operational challenge. The question remains as to
whether this paradigm shift represents a transient diversion from the
military’s traditional focus on large-scale conventional conflict, or if the
experiences of the last decade will have a lasting influence on approaches
to land warfare and development of future capabilities and doctrine.
Certainly the Army’s natural inclination suggests a return to familiar
ground of thinking about, and preparing for, conventional land force
engagements. However, the catalysts of individualized warfare may not
allow a full return to more traditional operating methods. The recent
National Intelligence Council Global Trends report depicts a near-future
security environment characterized by terrorism, subversion, sabotage,
insurgency, and criminal activities; while others predict continuing outbreaks of “hybrid” wars similar to the ongoing conflicts in Syria and
Ukraine.57 The commonality among these diverse scenarios is that they

53     Danya Greenfield, “The Case Against Drone Strikes on People Who Only ‘Act’ Like Terrorists,”
The Atlantic, August 19, 2013. Also, Lawfare Staff, “Civilian Casualties & Collateral Damage,” Lawfare,
http://www.lawfareblog.com/wiki/the-lawfare-wiki-document-library/targeted-killing/contro
versy/.
54      Greg Miller, “Plan for Hunting Terrorists Signals US Intends to Keep Adding Names to Kill
Lists,” Washington Post, October 23, 2012.
55      Brennan, “The Efficacy and Ethics of US Counterterrorism Strategy.”
56      Lamb and Munsing, Secret Weapon: High-Value Target Teams as an Organizational Innovation, 53.
57      US National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds (Washington DC: US
Director of National Intelligence, December 2012), 59–60.
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are all likely to involve targeting against decentralized, individual combatants who use anonymity to operational advantage.
However, current operations against the Islamic State may well prove
a frustrating test case for the effectiveness of individualized targeting in
the absence of significant ground forces and robust local intelligence
networks. Unclassified reports of target selection during the early
phases of Operation Inherent Resolve reveal patterns closely resembling
conventional approaches, with a clear majority of strikes focused on
facilities, fighting positions and vehicles, and far fewer against specific
individuals and key leadership.58 Yet, even success in this effort may have
a potential downside. As the military continues to identify and strike
individuals from greater distances and with higher accuracy, it should be
expected that adaptive adversaries will move towards locations (megacities) or modes of operation (cyber) where US targeting advantages are
less asymmetric.
While there is little debate as to the awe-inspiring tactical efficiency
of US techniques for waging individualized warfare, it is less certain
these methods have been effective in achieving larger political objectives. The perpetual regeneration of terrorist threats inside Pakistan,
Yemen and Somalia offer little evidence these techniques have been
fully successful as a centerpiece of counterterrorism strategy. Likewise,
deteriorating conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan suggest limits as to
what these approaches deliver to counterinsurgency efforts. The inherent ambiguity in the data raises the more difficult question as to whether
one can evaluate the utility of specific tactics and tools separately
from the overall strategic outcomes they produce. As General H. R.
McMaster, Director of the Army’s Capabilities and Integration Center,
has cautioned, “targeting does not equal strategy.”59 This area should
one be of continuing research and professional debate.
As President Obama recently observed during an address to
National Defense University, “we must define the nature and scope of
this struggle, or else it will define us.”60 Indeed, this has been the case
for an entire generation of soldiers socialized under this operational
paradigm and now highly skilled in the art of waging individualized war.
As one senior US officer recently noted, the task of “putting warheads
to foreheads” has become a core military function. The challenge ahead
will be creating a context whereby the experiences and tools refined
over the last decade can evolve and mature as an integrated component
of full-spectrum operations. The risk is that this expertise will be lost in
a rush back to focus on conventional warfare, or marginalized as some
exotic, niche function within a narrowing scope of strategic utility for
American land forces.
The goal should be full integration of these capabilities into a flexible landpower concept enabling rapid transition along the operational
continuum from conventional conflict against state adversaries to
58      Kedar Pavgi, “Five Months of Air Strikes in Iraq and Syria in Four Charts,” Defense One, January 8,
2015, http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2015/01/5-months-air-strikes-iraq-and-syria-4-charts/
102495/?oref=d_brief_nl.
59      Sydney J. Freedberg, “Raiders, Advisors And The Wrong Lessons From Iraq,” Breaking
Defense, March 20, 2013, http://breakingdefense.com/2013/03/gen-mcmaster-raiders-advisors-andthe-wrong-lessons-from-iraq/.
60      President Barrack Obama at National Defense University, May 23, 2013.
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individualized warfare in hybrid scenarios against non-state actors. To
this end, several specific recommendations are offered.

Recommendations

First, ensure that the technical capabilities refined over the last
decade continue to evolve even in the absence of a persistent operational targeting mission. The challenge of future hybrid scenarios, such
as the situation in Ukraine, will be in detecting and exploiting nonstandard signatures and data sources (cyber, open source, social media,
biometrics and forensics) and integrating them with conventional collection streams in support of situational awareness and targeting. This
task will require continuing advances in data processing and tools for
analyzing large amounts of unstructured information with the ultimate
goal of cross-domain integration, automated tipping and queuing, and
improved network visualization. These represent enormous technical
challenges that cannot wait for the next crisis.
Second, continue efforts to empower soldiers down to the lowest
level with real-time integrated data from national level sources. Current
biometrics technologies represent one useful example where a squad
leader on patrol can rapidly access national-level watchlist information
and biographic data on a subject encountered during tactical questioning. Within the contemporary threat paradigm there is no clearly
bounded battlespace; therefore, an individual of interest encountered in
a combat zone may also have relevance to a customs agent at an international airport, a police officer conducting a routine stop in Tucson, or
a counterterrorism analyst at the CIA. Bureaucratic interests, technical
barriers, and over-classification must not inhibit robust information
sharing between such entities. Informational empowerment downward
to the tactical level must be the ultimate goal so situational awareness is
not limited to the operations center.
Finally, continue to integrate concepts such as Identity Intelligence
and Network Analysis fully into the doctrinal canon and operational
usage. By all indications, various forms of hybrid or irregular warfare
will persist in the near future. These scenarios are likely to include lethal
and non-lethal targeting against networked entities operating in ungoverned spaces with weak identity regimes and adversaries determined to
leverage anonymity for operational advantage.
The techniques of individualized warfare and need for identity
verification on the battlefield will only grow in importance. The Army,
in particular, cannot afford to squander the hard lessons it has already
learned about waging this kind of war.

